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A new opening in relations  
between the EU and the Western Balkans 
Marta Szpala
The EU-Western Balkans summit held on 17 May in Sofia – the first such event since 2003 – 
is one example of the EU’s increasing interest in the Balkan states which aspire to member-
ship. On 6 February, the European Commission presented its new strategy for its Western 
Balkans policy. Its desire to become more closely involved in the region has also been indicat-
ed by visits from the EC President Jean-Claude Juncker and the head of the European Council 
Donald Tusk to all the countries in the region during recent months. This activity on the part 
of EU institutions has been accompanied by actions targeted at the Balkans by member states 
under the aegis of the Berlin process, which focuses on economic cooperation. This new dy-
namic in the EU’s policies towards the Western Balkans is the result of a growing awareness in 
Brussels of the risks resulting from the crisis in the enlargement policy, which is the EU’s main 
instrument for ensuring lasting stability in the region.
In the last few years, most of the Balkan states have seen setbacks in the process of building 
democratic institutions and market economies, despite fifteen years of reforms under the 
auspices of the EU and their formal progress towards accession. The Balkan states’ weakness 
poses a growing threat to the security of the EU member states, especially in areas such as 
illegal migration, drug trafficking, and the smuggling of people and arms. These formally 
pro-European governments, which base their power on clientele networks, are ready to use 
nationalist and anti-EU rhetoric in order to channel public frustration, a habit which generates 
frequent tension in the region and threatens its stability. At the same time, the EU’s influence 
in the Balkans has weakened as a result of the increasingly active policies of Russia, China, 
Turkey and Arab states in the area.
In proposing its new strategy for its Balkans policy, the European Commission has taken into 
account the member states’ common fears of what might happen upon the accession of states 
in which the rule of law is not respected. As it tries to reconcile these concerns with the need 
to deepen cooperation between the EU and the Balkan states, the EC has proposed bringing 
the EU and the Balkans closer together through sectoral integration and infrastructure before 
the latter are granted full membership. This plan is beneficial for the Balkan states’ elites, 
who are interested in the immediate benefits of sectoral integration with the EU, but not in 
implementing democratic reforms and free markets, which would undermine the current sys-
tem of government in their countries. Consequently, the present actions will most likely only 
have limited results; the Balkan states will become more integrated with the EU, but will not 
necessarily become more law-abiding or democratic.
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The ineffectiveness  
of the enlargement policy 
The EU-Western Balkans summit in May, the 
publication of the EU’s new Balkans strategy1 
and the EU institutions’ diplomatic activities are 
part of an unprecedented wave of EU interest 
in the Balkans over the last year. At the previ-
ous European Council in Thessaloniki in 2003, 
the countries of the region were promised EU 
membership upon fulfilling certain conditions. 
Fifteen years after this event, only Croatia has 
become an EU member, and the state institu-
tions and market economies in the other coun-
tries remain very weak, despite these countries’ 
formal progress along the route to accession 
(see Table 1). The negative trends in the region 
have been noted both in NATO reports2 and in 
global rankings on the rule of law3, freedom 
of the press4 and levels of corruption. Also, as 
the European Commission presented its new 
strategy, it sharply criticised the capture of the 
state, links with organised crime at all levels of 
government and administration, and the strong 
entanglement of public and private interests5. 
1 The document A credible enlargement perspective for and 
enhanced EU engagement with the Western Balkans has 
been published in the form of a communiqué from the 
EC to the European Parliament, the European Council, the 
European Economic and Social Committee and the Com-
mittee of the Regions. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/
sites/beta-political/files/communication-credible-enlarge-
ment-perspective-western-balkans_en.pdf
2 For example, see A renewed deterioration in the West-
ern Balkans, 02.02.2017, https://www.nato.int/docu/ 
Review/2017/Also-in-2017/backsliding-western-bal-
kans-kosovo-servia-bosnia/PL/index.htm
3 In the Freedom House rankings Nations in Transit in 2017, 
of the six Balkan states only Kosovo has received a better 
assessment of compliance with the principles of the rule 
of law compared to 2009. The other countries have seen 
a regression with regard to the rule of law. None of the Bal-
kan states were considered fully democratic. The worst sit-
uation in this respect was found in Bosnia & Herzegovina, 
Kosovo and Macedonia. Nations in Transit 2017: The False 
Promise of Populism, https://freedomhouse.org/report/na-
tions-transit/nations-transit-2017 
4 Reports on the freedom of the press confirm the deterio-
ration of standards in this area in comparison with 2009. 
Freedom of the Press 2017, April 2017, https://freedom-
house.org/report/freedom-press/freedom-press-2017 
5 A credible enlargement perspective…, op. cit., p. 4.
The EC also emphasised the lack of freedom for 
the media, widespread corruption and the low 
level of economic freedom. Further, the EC ac-
cused the Balkans’ formally pro-European gov-
ernments of employing nationalist and anti-EU 
rhetoric, and of provoking tension in relations 
with their neighbours in order to mobilise soci-
ety (particularly before elections) and channel 
the public frustration linked to the economic 
and political situation in the region. As the EC 
has emphasised, not only is this not conducive to 
the process of European integration, it also dest-
abilises the situation in the region as a whole6.
The slow pace of the enlargement process stems 
not only from the internal situation in the Bal-
kan states, but also from the activities of the EU 
itself, which abandoned the pursuit of an active 
policy towards this region after 2008. The EU’s 
internal problems, caused by factors includ-
ing the global economic crisis, have caused its 
neighbourhood policy (including towards the 
Balkans) to lose a great deal of importance. In 
Western Europe, the critical evaluation of the 
consequences of the EU’s expansions in 2004 
and 2007 has strengthened opposition to the 
admission of new members7. At the same time, 
the Balkans’ relative socio-political stability 
since 2008 has meant there have been no im-
pulses that would demand the EU’s intense in-
6 One exception is Macedonia, where in 2016 the political 
elite (which had been ruling since 2006) was removed from 
government as a result of many years’ peaceful protests.
7 According to a Eurobarometer survey of 2015 in Austria, 
75% of the population was against further enlargement. 
In Germany this percentage amounted to 73%, in Luxem- 
bourg 69% and in France 67%. See Europeans’ views on 
the priorities of the European Union, http://ec.europa.
eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/index.cfm/Result-
Doc/download/DocumentKy/72669 
Despite formal progress in EU accession, 
the Balkan countries have gone back-
wards in building democratic institutions 
and a market economy system.
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volvement in the region. In this context, the can-
didate countries’ lack of progress in fulfilling EU 
conditions was paradoxically a plus for the EU, 
as it allowed the challenges of acquiring new 
members to be postponed. As a consequence, 
pressure on the Balkan states to enact the nec-
essary reforms weakened greatly. This policy 
culminated in the statement by Jean-Claude 
Juncker in 2014 that there would be no new ex-
pansion over the next five years. Even though 
none of the Balkan states had any chance of 
accession before 2019, the Balkan elites consid-
ered the emphasis of this fact as a withdrawal 
of the promise of membership which had been 
made in 2003. The EU’s policy towards the Bal-
kans in addition has also been complicated by 
Brexit. The United Kingdom was one of the 
biggest supporters of the region’s states join-
ing the EU. Moreover, for the elites and publics 
in the region, Britain’s decision to leave the EU 
was an additional argument undermining the 
attractiveness and benefits of membership8.
The enlargement policy, which has so far been 
the EU’s most effective tool of influence on its 
immediate neighbourhood, allowed the accel-
eration of the democratic transformation of the 
Central European countries in the 1990s. The 
prospect of obtaining the benefits of member-
ship motivated the candidate countries’ gov-
ernments to implement reforms. In the case of 
the Balkan states, however, this approach has 
not had such good results. The reasons for this 
include the following: in the name of regional 
8 Brexit was used by Russian propaganda in the Balkans 
to show the EU as an area mired in permanent economic 
and social crisis.
stability, the member states and EU institutions 
have used the enlargement policy to put pres-
sure on the Balkan countries in areas not relat-
ed to the technical process of implementing the 
EU acquis. In addition, these activities have of-
ten been inconsistent. In Bosnia & Herzegovina 
the EU made progress towards integration 
conditional on the introduction of reforms to 
the police and the political system, but  nev-
ertheless accepted that state’s application for 
membership, even though it did not meet the 
majority of the EU’s conditions.  Kosovo and 
Serbia were rewarded with progress towards 
integration for their compromises in the pro-
cess of normalising relations, under the aegis of 
the EU, regardless of their failure to implement 
reforms. This policy meant that the Balkan 
elites recognised that putting political pressure 
on EU member states was a more effective way 
to achieve progress in the enlargement process, 
for example by using the threat of deepening 
cooperation with Russia, or by escalating bilat-
eral disputes. Negative consequences for the 
effectiveness of EU policies also arose from the 
practice of EU member states blocking the en-
largement process in order to force the states 
aspiring to membership to make concessions in 
bilateral disputes. The flagship example of this 
is the policy conducted by Greece, which has 
not allowed accession negotiations with Mac-
edonia to start since 2008 in connection with 
a dispute over the latter state’s official name9. 
This has arisen despite Macedonia’s compliance 
with the technical conditions posed by the EU. 
As a result of these two tendencies, the degree 
of progress towards integration has ceased to 
reflect the real state of progress in making re-
forms, especially in the field of the rule of law. 
The lack of pressure from the EU to reinforce 
state institutions caused the clear subordina-
9 For more on this topic see M. Szpala, Macedonia: 
A new beginning in relations with Greece, OSW Analyses, 
31.01.2018: https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/anal 
yses/2018-01-31/macedonia-a-new-beginning-rela-
tions-greece
The EU has limited its criticism of the 
undemocratic practices of formally 
pro-Western Balkan leaders who have 
helped stop migration.
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tion of those institutions to party structures, 
whose power is based on extensive clientelist 
network.
The EU’s internal problems, the migration cri-
sis in 2015 and the growing influence of Russia 
have led to the EU significantly limiting its crit-
icism of the Balkan ruling elites’ undemocratic 
practices, and focusing on its cooperation with 
them in order to limit migration and keep indi-
vidual countries within the Euro-Atlantic sphere 
of influence. The Balkan leaders who are in 
a position to guarantee these things then re-
ceive support from the EU, which in turn places 
less weight on holding them responsible for im-
plementing reforms.Politicians who in the eyes 
of the West prevent the seizure of power by 
radical parties which could pose a threat to the 
stability of the region can also rely on getting 
an easy ride10. Balkan politicians whose parties 
work closely together with the strongest EU po-
litical groups also get off more lightly. For ex-
ample, the European People’s Party, and in par-
ticular Hungary’s Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, 
defended the regime of Nikola Gruevski and 
the VMRO-DPMNE in Macedonia, even when 
the latter tried to remain in power despite los-
ing general elections.
The EU’s new rivals in the Balkans 
Russia, China and Turkey have taken advantage 
of the EU’s passivity, and have strengthened 
their networks of influence in the Balkans at 
10 This is the situation in Kosovo, where the West supports 
a corrupt ruling elite, fearing the takeover of govern-
ment by the Vetëvendosje party, which wants to limit 
the influence of external forces.
the expense of the EU’s position. Russia’s ac-
tions in the Balkans are patently contrary to the 
EU’s priorities in the region. It is in Moscow’s 
interest to maintain the frozen conflicts and 
constant tensions in the area, and to block the 
Balkan countries’ Euro-Atlantic integration be-
cause this weakens the Kremlin’s influence. By 
using its influence in the local media and ruling 
elites, Moscow is attempting to stoke inter-eth-
nic tension, block reform processes (particularly 
in the energy sector), strengthen anti-EU and 
anti-NATO groups, and sabotage the bilateral 
negotiations to resolve disputes (such as Serbia/
Kosovo and Greece/Macedonia). For their part, 
China and Turkey are focusing on deepening 
their economic ties with the Balkan countries. 
Officially they support stability and Euro-Atlan-
tic integration within the region, but in contrast 
to the EU, they have not made financial loans 
conditional upon reforms. This makes financial 
support from the EU less attractive, and thus 
weakens the force of the EU’s instruments for 
pressure on Balkan governments. Moreover, 
both the Turkish and Chinese business models 
are based on close (and often corrupt) relation-
ships with local elites. Such practices are in con-
flict with the priorities of the EU, which calls for 
the introduction of transparency in the Balkan 
states’ public administrations. In the long run, 
China and Turkey may also use their influence in 
the Balkans to exert pressure on the EU and its 
member states.
Rising Euroscepticism  
and challenges to stability 
Public support in the Balkan states for the idea 
of EU membership has been gradually declining 
for several years now. This means that public 
pressure for quick integration with the EU is 
weakening significantly, whereas in the past it 
was an important part of the pressure on the 
authorities to implement the reforms required 
by the EU. The decline in support for accession 
is also associated with the EU undermining the 
Russia, China and Turkey have exploited 
the passivity of the EU and strengthened 
their networks of influence in the Balkans 
at the expense of the EU’s position.
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credibility of the prospects for membership; 
this has led to a feeling that the countries in 
the region have no real chance of entering the 
EU. At the same time, many years of reforms 
introduced under the slogan of adapting to EU 
standards have not produced measurable and 
positive effects, in the perception of the pub-
lic. The rising disillusion with the EU has also 
strengthened by the political elites, which have 
blamed the EU’s conditions for the implemen-
tation of unpopular reforms or taking steps 
which are controversial in the eyes of society, 
such as prosecuting war crimes or normalising 
relations with their neighbours. Another issue 
which significantly contributed to the drop in 
support for the EU has been the latter’s support 
for undemocratic elites – something which the 
public sees as conflicting with the values that 
Brussels officially promotes. The EU’s member 
states and institutions are increasingly seen 
as the allies of the local regimes, and as being 
reluctant to support pro-democratic protests. 
One noteworthy example of such practices was 
the crisis in Macedonia in 2015-16: despite the 
evidence of the Macedonian authorities’ auto-
cratic practices, as described in EU documents, 
the EU member states did not condemn the ac-
tions of the Gruevski regime, and some clearly 
supported them. Consequently, even the Bal-
kan states’ liberal elites now use pro-EU rhet-
oric less frequently than before. In the Balkan 
societies, the belief is spreading that the EU 
prefers to legitimise undemocratic regimes in 
the name of regional stability, instead of pro-
moting the implementation of pro-democratic 
reforms.
The effects of the lack of EU pressure to build 
efficient institutions were visible during the ref-
ugee crisis in 2015 and 2016. Weak state ap-
paratuses, controlled by corrupt oligarchies, 
could not and still cannot effectively combat 
the smuggling of human beings, weapons and 
drugs to EU countries. Nor can they deal with 
the problem of illegal trading in significant 
amounts of weapons and explosives which are 
used by terrorist groups and organised crime11. 
Moreover, the bad economic situation and cli-
entele-based political systems are strengthen-
ing migratory pressures in the Balkan states; 
between 2014 and 2016, 377,000 residents of 
the region applied for asylum in the EU. This has 
increased the problems of the member states, 
which are already struggling with the conse-
quences of the global migration crisis. The scale 
of legal immigration from the Balkans is very 
great. At least 110,000 people left Serbia alone 
in the 2014-15 period12. Such a large number of 
migrants is not only a challenge for the EU, but 
it also negatively affects the growth potential 
in the region, because a significant percent-
age of those leaving are the best educated and 
most active of the population.
Another threat to stability in the region comes 
from the practices of local elites; as they no 
longer have the chance to offer their publics 
any spectacular successes, they have been ever 
less inclined to speak about European inte-
gration, while they have increasingly chosen 
to channel public dissatisfaction by using na-
tionalist slogans and generating tensions with 
their neighbours. The EU tolerated this practice 
for many years, and has only recently begun to 
openly criticise this kind of social mobilisation. 
11 Weapons from the Balkans have been used in terrorist 
attacks in France. See S. Candea, How EU Failures Helped 
Paris Terrorists Obtain Weapons, Der Spiegel 24.02.2016: 
http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/following-
the-path-of-the-paris-terror-weapons-a-1083461.html
12 Srbija po emigraciji 31. u svetu, iseljavanje poprimilo 
galopirajući rast, 30.10.2017: http://www.021.rs/story/
Info/Srbija/174766/Srbija-po-emigraciji-31-u-svetu-isel-
javanje-poprimilo-galopirajuci-rast.html
The EU legitimises undemocratic regimes 
in the name of stability of the region, 
which has weakened its credibility in the 
eyes of Balkan societies.
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The Berlin process: focus on the economy
With most countries being uninterested in the 
EU’s enlargement policy in the Balkans, in 2014 
the German Chancellor Angela Merkel initiated 
the so-called Berlin process, which covered sev-
en EU member states and the six Balkan coun-
tries aspiring to membership13. The purpose of 
this initiative was first and foremost to stimulate 
the Balkan countries’ economic development by 
investing in their infrastructure and harmonis-
ing their local regulations with EU law. In Ger-
many’s perception, the bad economic situation 
is the main cause of the Balkan democracies’ 
weakness and reluctance to undertake reforms. 
As part of this process, the concept of the Re-
gional Economic Area (REA) has been devised. 
This is a concept for a common market for the 
Western Balkan countries which is to operate 
according to the EU regulations of free move-
ment of persons, services, goods and capital; its 
creation is intended to improve and harmonise 
the regulatory environment and integrate the 
small Balkan economies. The second motor of 
growth, namely investment, is beginning to be 
funded and supported by the Western Balkans 
Investment Framework (WBIF). This instrument 
13 The Berlin Process is a project initiated by Germany, 
an intergovernmental platform for cooperation with 
the countries of the Western Balkans, in which Austria, 
France, Germany, the United Kingdom, Italy, Croatia, 
Slovenia, Albania, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Montenegro, 
Kosovo, Macedonia and Serbia participate. As part of 
the process, annual summits are held, attended by 
heads of state and government as well as EU represent-
atives (in 2014 this was held in Berlin, in 2015 in Vien-
na, in 2016 Paris, and in 2017 Trieste). At present this 
is the most important meeting between leaders of EU 
member states and those of the countries of the region 
aspiring to membership.
is intended to allow the better use of the finan-
cial resources which various institutions direct 
to the Western Balkans, and above all to sup-
port projects for integrated transport, energy 
and telecommunications systems in the region, 
and bind them closely with the EU14. Over time, 
the Berlin process has begun to include further 
areas of cooperation, such as security, as well 
as the stabilisation of the situation in the region 
by supporting reconciliation processes, etc.
The Berlin process has undoubtedly helped to 
sustain the interest of some EU member states 
in the Western Balkans, but it faces severe 
limitations within the countries of the region. 
Transforming the economy involves striking at 
the interests of the ruling elites in the Balkans, 
who control society by handing out jobs in the 
public sectors which predominate in the local 
economies. It also poses a threat to the local 
oligarchs, who are guaranteed monopoly posi-
tions on the market and government contracts 
by the authorities, thus inhibiting the growth 
of the private sector. The ephemeral nature of 
the Berlin process, with its formula of annual 
summits of heads of state, hinders the develop-
ment of long-term solutions that would allow 
the progress of reform to be monitored, or ex-
pert support to be guaranteed. Consequently, 
the involvement of the European Commission 
and other EU institutions in implementing the 
objectives of the process has increased, but this 
in turn has raised objections from those mem-
ber states which are not involved in this coop-
eration. The strategy which the EC presented in 
February 2018 was the response to these chal-
lenges, and was clearly inspired by the solutions 
proposed as part of the Berlin process. Due to 
the usefulness and flexibility of the Berlin pro-
cess, however, cooperation in this format will 
continue as a complement to the EU’s other ac-
tivities.
14 Between 2009 and 2017 the WBIF dispensed €601 mil-
lion in grants for the Balkan states.
The goal of the Berlin process is to stim-
ulate economic development through in-
vestments in infrastructure and harmon-
ising regulations with EU law.
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The EC’s new strategy: sectoral 
integration as the path to membership 
While presenting the Commission’s new strat-
egy Johannes Hahn, the Commissioner for the 
European Neighbourhood Policy and EU en-
largement negotiations, stated that the Europe-
an Union will either export stability to the Bal-
kans, or will import the threats from the region. 
It was the awareness of the rising challenges in 
the region and the reduced effectiveness of the 
current policy which formed the main impetus 
for the development of the new strategy. This is 
based on the gradual and sectoral integration 
of the Balkan states into the regulatory and in-
stitutional system of the EU. 
The priorities and actions proposed by the Com-
mission in its new strategy show the clear inspi-
ration of the proposals which have been devel-
oped as part of the Berlin process. The six key 
areas highlighted by the EC in its Balkans policy 
are security and migration, the strengthening 
of socio-economic development, integrated in-
frastructure, the digital agenda, the process of 
reconciliation and good neighbourly relations, 
and the rule of law. Only this latter priority had 
not previously been a subject of cooperation 
within the framework of the Berlin process.
Implementing this strategy is intended to 
strengthen existing platforms for EU-Balkan 
cooperation such as the Energy Community 
and the Transport Community15, and also an-
15 The Energy Community established in 2005 between the 
EU and the Balkans, as well as Moldova and Ukraine, 
assumes the expansion of the EU’s internal energy mar-
ket to those countries. The Transport Community, estab-
lished in 2017, assumes the gradual integration of the six 
Balkan states’ transport markets into the regulatory and 
infrastructure framework of the EU.
nounces the creation of new ones, such as the 
dialogue on common foreign and security pol-
icy. The Balkan states are also to be gradually 
included into meetings of the representatives 
of EU states at various levels. Institutions from 
the Balkan states will also be able to participate 
in the work of their EU counterparts on mat-
ters such as transport policy, regulating energy 
markets, and the Creative Europe programme. 
It has also been proposed to increase the range 
of activities available to the Balkans under the 
Erasmus Plus and Connecting Europe Facility. 
A significant part of the strategy relates to se-
curity issues and the close cooperation of the 
Balkan states with institutions such as Europol, 
Eurojust, etc. Support will also be offered for 
the process of harmonising Balkan regulations 
with EU standards, based on the Regional Eco-
nomic Area concept. In the area of the rule 
of law, which is essential for preparations for 
membership, a list of actions will be presented 
primarily concerning the reinforced monitoring 
of judicial reforms, media freedoms and respect 
for the rule of law. 
Prospects
The initiatives by the EU institutions and the 
member states concerning the Balkan states 
is a clear signal to the local publics and politi-
cal elites, disillusioned by the existing achieve-
ments in the European integration process, 
that the EU is still interested in their region. 
In the coming months, the current intense level 
of EU-Balkan ties will probably be maintained. 
In the reports on the progress of the EC reforms 
published in April, it was recommended that 
the European Council launch accession negoti-
ations with Albania and Macedonia. The  deci-
sion in this case should be taken in June. A sum-
mit on the Berlin process will take place this July 
in London; its priorities will be security issues, 
the fight against corruption, and the process of 
reconciliation and resolving bilateral disputes. 
More action under this platform has also been 
The goal of the Berlin process is to stim-
ulate economic development through in-
vestments in infrastructure and harmon-
ising regulations with EU law.
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announced; a further summit will be organised 
in Warsaw in 2019. In April a Digital Summit 
took place in Skopje, inaugurating deeper co-
operation between the EU and the Balkans in 
this field as well. Meetings on the digital agen-
da will take place annually from now on.
Balkan issues are a priority for the Bulgarian 
presidency of the EU Council, as well as for 
the next three presidencies – those of Austria 
in 2018, and Romania and Croatia in 2019. At 
the same time, it is clear that most EU countries 
are reluctant to rapidly adopt new members 
or present the Balkan states with a package of 
attractive benefits (including financial) to mo-
tivate them to implement reforms. One sign of 
this comes from the summit in Bulgaria, which 
was originally supposed to refer to the 2003 
summit in Thessaloniki (which was of key im-
portance for the enlargement policy), but due 
to resistance from member states, any refer-
ence to further expansion was omitted. 
The sectoral integration the EC has proposed 
as the main element of its offer to the Western 
Balkan countries is intended to keep them with-
in the EU’s orbit of influence in key areas before 
they meet the conditions for membership in the 
field of the rule of law. This approach assumes 
that the Balkan states’ gradual integration in 
the EU cooperation structure will force the lo-
cal governments to introduce democratic and 
free-market reforms. However, this concept 
does not take several basic restrictions into ac-
count. The idea still seems to prevail within the 
EU that the countries in the region have no alter-
native to integration into the EU and NATO, and 
that it is in the local political elites’ own inter-
est that they should make the effort to reform. 
Contrary to this image, belief in the region is 
increasing that other strong actors, such as Chi-
na and Turkey, may be attractive alternatives to 
the weakening EU, especially as they do not set 
any initial conditions for cooperation. Above 
all, however, the Balkan political elites have 
benefited from the unfinished transformation 
process, and the implementation of democrat-
ic and free-market reforms would undermine 
their central position in their countries’ politi-
cal and economic systems. In a situation when 
the EU is still trying to avoid open criticism of 
those elites which have been acting contrary 
to the principles of democracy, and above all is 
still unwilling to take any action against politi-
cians who resort to nationalist rhetoric and au-
tocratic practices, the chances of consolidating 
the rule of law in the region are small. It is the 
weakness of the institutions of the rule of law 
which poses the major obstacle to the region’s 
faster economic development and integration 
with the EU. Consequently, the effectiveness of 
the EU’s current activities regarding the Balkans 
will remain limited. 
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APPENDIX 
Table 1. The progress of the Western Balkan countries in the European integration process
Country Signed the Stabilisa-
tion and Association 
Agreement (SAA) 
Applied for 
membership
Obtained status of 
candidate  country
Started 
accession 
negotiations
Current state of acces-
sion negotiations 
Croatia 2001 2004 2005 2005 Member of the EU 
since 2013 
Montenegro 2007 2008 2010 2012 30 chapters open,  
3 preliminarily closed
Serbia 2008 2009 2012 2014  12 chapters open 
2 preliminarily closed
Macedonia 2001 2004 2005  
Albania 2006 2009 2014
Bosnia & Herzegovina 2008 2016
Kosovo 2015
Table 2. Selected economic indicators in 2017 
Country Population in 
millions 
GDP per capita by purchas-
ing power parity as %  
(EU average)
GDP growth Unemploy-
ment 
Public debt as %  
of GDP 
Croatia 4 60% 2,8% 9,1% 78%
Montenegro 0,6 45% 3,9% 17,2% 65,1%
Serbia 7 37% 2,0% 13,5% 61,5%
Macedonia 2 37% 1,7% 22,2% 38,7%
Albania 2,8 29% 4% 14,2% 68,2%
Bosnia & Herzegovina 3,5 32% b.d. 20,5% 39,1%
Kosovo 1,9 b.d. b.d. 27,5% 16,6% 
Source: Eurostat
 
